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Markets work best when the rules of the game are stable, property rights are secure 
and contracts are observed. These conditions are promoted by the rule of law in the 
classical liberal sense of the supremacy of g eneral laws over public and private 
authority. Devices such as mixed government and the separation of powers are 
believed to be conducive to the rule of law. However, the degree of formal separation 
of powers in a constitution does not always co-relate to rule of law conditions and 
hence to economic performance. Hence the speculation that the separation of powers 
is not a necessary condition to the rule of law. The paper argues against such a 
conclusion by developing an account of the separation of powers that focuses on its 
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An overview 
I start with the following assumptions. Market oriented economies perform 
better than planned economies. Markets work best when the rules of social 
life are stable, property rights (to acquire, hold and dispose of things) are 
secure and contracts are freely made and kept. These conditions are promoted 
by government under the rule of law and conversely deteriorate under 
arbitrary government. The final assumption, which is the subject of this 
inquiry, is that the separation of powers is a necessary though not a sufficient 
condition for government under law. However, it is observable that the degree of 
formal separation of powers in a constitution does not always co-relate to rule of law 
conditions. Therefore there is speculation that the separation of powers is not a 
necessary condition to the rule of law. The paper argues against such a conclusion by 
developing an account of the separation of powers that focuses on its methodological 
thesis in addition to its better known thesis of the diffusion of power. I reach the 
conclusion that although the benefits of the separation of powers can be maintained 
under certain conditions by methodological means alone, without the aid of a 
diffusion of powers they are likely to be short lived. However, history has shown that 
methodological separation of powers may be promoted by diffusions of power that are 
not necessarily along the lines of the tri-partite division epitomised in the US 
Constitution.  
  My assumption that rule of law conditions promote economic progress may be 
questioned by some who have observed the rapid economic growth and prosperity of 
the so-called Asian Tigers, South Korea, Taiwan,  Singapore and Malaysia in 
particular. All these countries achieved impressive economic advancement under 
varying degrees of authoritarianism although in the case in South Korea, and Taiwan 
they continue to perform well after their transition to democratic constitutionalism. 
Malaysia and Singapore have always practiced a limited form of democratic 
government.  It will be my argument that while these countries endured (and in the 
case of Malaysia and Singapore continues to endure) a substantial democratic deficit, 
they enjoyed stable rules of the game, property rights and a large measure of 
individual freedom under the law. The so called ‘Chinese paradox’ on closer scrutiny 
reveals a similar story. China’s rapid economic rise coincided with the creation of 
property rights including land rights in urban areas, the introduction of regular courts, 
partial deregulation of commerce and consumer choice and generally the promotion   3 
of a private sector economy. I will return to these issues in the course of this essay. 
 
Since Montesquieu’s classic description of the post revolution English 
constitution, the doctrine of the separation of powers has been identified with 
the constitutional system of checks and balances. The vesting of legislative, 
executive and judicial powers in separate organs (the tripartite separation of 
powers) is a proven means of inhibiting the absolutist tendencies particularly 
when combined with other devices such as representative democracy and the 
geographical dispersal of power under federal arrangements. However, the 
logic of the tripartite separation of powers is only partially revealed by its 
presentation as a system of checks and balances. It does not explain fully 
how the separation of powers secures the rule of law or constitutional 
government. The aim of this paper is to examine some of the critical 
moments in the history of the idea of the separation of powers as a means of 
understanding the reasons for its persistence in political thought and to 
illuminate its central role in securing the  rule of law and constitutional 
government. The essay leads to an assessment of the health of the doctrine in 
the conditions of contemporary parliamentary democracy. 
The doctrine of the separation of powers subsumes two distinct theses. 
The first thesis, which I will call the methodological thesis of the doctrine, is 
about the nature of each power and the way in which the power must be 
exercised. The second thesis that I will term the diffusion thesis is about the 
allocation of power. The methodological thesis holds that the legislative, 
executive and judicial power each has its own character that requires the 
power to be exercised in a manner appropriate to the power. The theory 
postulates that the failure to exercise each power accordingly results in 
failure of the rule of law. In the seventeenth century England, the two fold 
separation of powers between law making and executive functions was well 
known.
1 However, the classic statement of the methodological thesis is found 
in Locke’s  Second Treatise of Civil Government. In Locke’s theory of 
government the great evil in the state of nature is that persons are their own 
lawgivers, judges and enforcers. People escape the state of nature by 
                                                                 
1 M J C Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, (1967), 51   4 
entrusting their powers to a supreme authority, the Legislative who must 
secure the common good ‘by providing against those three defects above-
mentioned that made the State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie’. Hence the 
supreme authority ‘is bound to govern by establish’d standings Laws 
promulgated and known to the People, and not by Extemporary Decrees; by 
indifferent and upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies by those 
Laws; And to employ the force of the Community at home, only in the 
execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress Foreign Injuries, and 
secure the Community from Inroads and Invasion’.
2 The legislative power is 
the power to make laws of general application and does not include the 
power to make decrees for the particular case. Executive power is the power 
to defend the realm, police the law and conduct the affairs of state. Judicial 
power is the power to impartially determine disputes concerning the rights 
and liberties of persons according to standing law.  
It is possible to imagine an omnipotent ruler entrusted with all three 
powers who exercises each power in keeping with its character. This super-
endowed Lockean ruler will personally or through officials make general and 
impersonal laws in the public interest, enforce the law equally and adjudicate 
disputes impartially. Sadly, such rulers are rare exceptions,
3 history being 
instead the testament of Acton’s famous epigram that ‘power corrupts and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely’. Hence the diffusion thesis that the rule 
of law and constitutional government is secure only when legislative, 
executive and judicial powers are reposed in different agencies of the state 
which are independent of each other to a substantial degree. The diffusion 
thesis is born out of the mistrust of omnipotent authority memorably 
expressed by James Madison’s observation in Federalist No 51 that ‘If men 
were angels, no government will be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controuls on government would be necessary’.
4  
The classic exposition of the diffusion thesis is found in James Madison’s 
                                                                 
2 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government, (1970)   
3 Emperor Asoka of India comes to mind, whose emblems of strength (the Saranath Lions) and of 
righteousness (the Asokan Chakra) are guiding symbols of the modern Indian Republic. 
4 J Madison , Federalist Paper No 51’ in A Hamilton, J Madison and J Jay The Federalist Papers by 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay (1982) 262. Compare the previous observation of 
David Hume: ‘…on contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controuls 
of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his 
actions, than private interest’. D Hume, Essays Moral, Political and Literary (1987) 42.   5 
Federalist Papers, particularly Nos 10, 47 and 51. where he concludes that 
‘The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the 
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced as the very definition of 
tyranny’.
5  
It takes little reflection to notice that neither the methodological thesis 
nor the diffusion thesis is capable by itself of explaining the logic of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers. The vesting of each power in a different 
agency does not prevent agencies from acting arbitrarily unless the nature 
and the methodological constraints on each power are recognised and 
observed. History is again our witness. Legislatures sometimes make law for 
the case without laying down general rules of conduct. The executive, 
usually with authority delegated by the legislature, arbitrarily creates or sets 
aside the rights of citizens. The judiciary disregards the law through 
excessive creativity in adjudication. These are commonplace incidents even 
in states that take the constitutional division of powers seriously. The 
indispensability of the methodological thesis is most evident in parliamentary 
systems where the executive has a large share of the legislative power.   
In many parliamentary democracies including Australia, executive law 
making even on matters of public policy is considered constitutionally 
acceptable provided that such laws are subject to repeal or revision by the 
legislature. The logic of this view is seriously weakened by the fact that the 
legislature in parliamentary systems usually obeys the executive which is in 
office precisely because it commands the loyalty of a majority in parliament. 
In unicameral parliamentary systems the will of parliament is mostly the will 
of the executive. In bicameral parliamentary systems, upper houses may 
check executive ambitions from time to time but they have little time or 
capacity to police the vast amounts of discretionary power accumulated by 
the executive branch under permissive legislation. Under these 
circumstances, parliamentary democracies rely heavily on judicial oversight 
of executive action. Courts and administrative review tribunals remedy 
individual grievances but cannot address the general problem which is the 
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systemic arbitrariness of government resulting from the revision of the 
separation of powers doctrine.  
The ancient and medieval constitutionalism placed greater emphasis 
on the methodological thesis. In period following the Glorious Revolution of 
1688, the diffusion thesis came to prominence and was embraced by the 
founders of the US Constitution. In England, the classical two-fold division 
of powers developed into the tripartite separation that was famously 
described by Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws. While the tripartite 
division stabilised in the United States with the help of its written 
constitution and an assertive Supreme Court, in Britain, the model 
metamorphosised into the asymmetrical form associated with parliamentary 
sovereignty and ministerial responsibility. The current model of governance 
under parliamentary democracy blurs the executive-legislative divide while 
accentuating the separation of judicial and non-judicial powers. It is the 
reverse of the ancient form of the doctrine where the executive-judicial 
division was unclear while the legislative-executive separation was 
paramount. The history of the separation of powers as it has culminated in 
modern parliamentary systems reveals the transformation of doctrine from 
the classical two-fold separation to the tripartite separation and thence to the 
20
th century version of the two-fold division.   
Phase  Division 
Classical and medieval 
theory 
Legislative  Executive-Judicial 
19
th century English 
theory and US model 
Legislative  Executive  Judicial 
20
th C parliamentary 
democracy 
Legislative-Executive  Judicial 
 
I am not suggesting that the divisions were or can ever be as clear cut as this 
diagram indicates. Classifications of social phenomena are always imperfect 
and constitutions never fully live up to the models that we construct to 
explain them. Thus in modern parliamentary democracy, though the 
executive dominates the parliamentary agenda, the legislators provide critical   7 
feedback from the electorate and pressure groups that help shape executive 
decisions. In the past when judges served in royal courts at the monarch’s 
pleasure, they were not entirely subservient to the regal will. Discerning 
readers will treat the diagram as a helpful broad brush presentation of the 
doctrine’s mutations.  
 
Separation of powers and the rule of law 
Separation of powers is inextricably linked to the rule of law as understood 
in the classical sense. The ideal of the rule of law has been at the centre of political 
theory ever since Aristotle posed his famous question whether it is better to be 
governed by the best men or by the best laws.
6 Aristotle argued: ‘He is a better ruler 
who is free from passion than he who is passionate. Whereas the law is passionless, 
passion must ever sway the heart of man.’
7 Despite its long history in political 
thought, the rule of law remains an imprecise concept and a subject of frequent and 
impassioned debate. The common element in all ‘rule of law’ theories is the 
proposition that acts affecting the rights or obligations of a person must be authorised 
by law. That is the easy part. The hard question is: what do we mean by ‘law’ in 
relation to the rule of law? The extreme positivists say that whatever the ruler 
commands is law, whether it takes the form of a general rule of conduct or a specific 
decree directed at an individual. According to this view, the executioner who hangs a 
prisoner condemned without trial by an omnipotent dictator will be upholding the rule 
of law. In classical theory, where the law takes the shape of the momentary will of an 
absolute ruler, there is no rule of law but rule of a person. The rule of law by this way 
of thinking means the supremacy of general laws (Aristotle’s passionless law) over all 
authority, public or private. It is the Rechtstaat of German jurisprudence. The rule of 
law in this sense is an ideal and, like all ideals, it is achievable only in approximation. 
Constitutions do not and cannot eliminate all forms of arbitrariness in governance.  
 
If the rule of law is defeated when the law is identified with the momentary will of the 
ruler, then the separation of the law from the ruler’s unilateral will is a necessary 
condition for the achievement of the rule of law. The participation of a ruler in law 
making (legislative) and law applying (judicial) functions is not fatal to the rule of law 
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provided that in governing he is compelled to observe the laws and judgments of the 
realm of which he is himself an author. The ruler’s observance of law and judgments 
cannot be assured unless there are institutional checks on his power. Hence it is 
impossible to extricate the rule of law from the separation of powers in both the 
methodological and the organisational senses. The corollary of this proposition is that 
the achievement of the rule of  law conditions naturally separates powers to some 
degree. In a sense the rule of law and the separation of powers are two sides of the 
same coin.  
 
Aristotle and the Hellenic laboratory  
The idea that the ruler did not make law but ruled according to law has ancient origins 
and is the immediate source of the theory that in the constitutional state the power of 
government does not include the power to make law. In the natural history of 
humankind, legislative power is a recent occurrence. The great law givers like Ur-
Nammu, Hammurabi, Solon, and Lykurgus did not claim to make law but to state the 
law.
8 Rulers made law, but rarely confessed to it, pretending rather to be ridding the 
law of its corruptions. The systematic practice of legislation is first observed in the 
organised city-states of classical Greece. Different models of statecraft emerged 
among the Greek states. Aristotle noticed, three beneficent models: monarchy, 
aristocracy and polity (disciplined democracy) and also their corruptions: tyranny, 
oligarchy and democracy.  The beneficent models were distinguished from their 
corrupt counterparts by the prevalence of the rule of law. He saw in the corrupted 
forms of government the ascendancy of the idea that the public good is served by the 
best men whether they be absolute monarchs, elite groups or popular majorities. 
Hence, in the Politics, Aristotle posed the famous question whether it is better to be 
governed by the best men or by the best laws. Aristotle concluded that the ‘The law 
ought to be Supreme over all, and the magistracies and the government should judge 
only of particulars. So that if democracy be a real form of government the sort of 
Constitution in which all things are  regulated by decrees is clearly not a 
democracy in the true sense of the word, for decrees relate only to particulars’.
9  
Aristotle observed that when a popular assembly decides every detail, it ceases to 
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express the popular consensus but becomes the tool of demagogues.
10 He perceived that 
genuine popular consensus is possible only on general principles and not on particular 
outcomes. The hallmark of a polity is that it is governed by laws and not passion. In 
the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle translated this insight into a theory of politics 
wherein he asserted that ‘ legislative science’ must control the science of 
administration. Administrators bear the same relation to the law giver as workmen 
to the master craftsman.
11 This is the essence of the methodological thesis.  
 
Separation of law and government in the Roman Republic 
Apart from Cicero's two treatises the  Republic and the Laws, and what remains of 
Polybius' Histories, there is little that represents a constitutional theory of republican 
Rome.  The pragmatic jurisprudence of the Romans was not given to  theorising. 
Roman constitutionalism is found in the actual practices of government about 
which, fortunately, there are reliable records.  The  constitution of the later 
Roman Republic is an outstanding example of a pronounced division of functions 
achieved without an articulated theory of government.  Polybius and Cicero 
attributed the success of the republic to its mixed government, a system thought 
to have been perfected in the Spartan Constitution of Lycurgus. There is however 
more to the success of the republican constitution than its mixed nature.  It is 
instructive to look at Rome’s constitutional structures  at the  zenith of its 
republican evolution in the late second and early first century B.C, approximately 
the period between the Second Punic War and the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus.   
The legislative power of Rome  was in the hands of the popular 
assemblies, the Comitia Centuriata and the Comitia Tributa (with its variant the 
Consilium Plebis).  This happened after  the  Lex Publilia and the  Lex Hortensia 
dispensed with the requirement of ratification of laws (pactum auctoritas) by the 
patrician Senate and granted the plebeian  tribunes power to initiate legislation 
which, when approved by the comitia gained the status of leges.  The executive 
powers of the Republic were exercised by officials (magistrati) the chief of 
who were the two consuls.  Among the other magistrates were the quaestors 
(responsible for  finance) the censors (who, apart from conducting the 
quinquennial census, were responsible for public works), the praetors (the 
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principal judicial officers) and the  aeidiles curules  (responsible for  city 
administration and police functions). All the magistrates were elected by the 
popular assemblies. Consuls, praetors and censors were elected by the comitia 
cencuriata and the curules aediles, quaestors, tribunes and certain other lower 
ranking officials, by the comitia tributa.  The Roman senate has lost most of 
its early powers but wielded much influence over all branches of government.  
The magistrates were senators ex officio. Its predominantly patrician composition 
produced a concentration of administrative experience and knowledge in the 
senate. The pre-occupation of the consuls in the imperial campaigns increased 
their reliance on the senate's advice. The rapid expansion of Rome's territorial 
jurisdiction, increased the importance of the senate's privilege of creating 
temporary magistracies by the prorogatio imperii. Above all, the senate played 
the role of an executive council, in the absence of any form of cabinet owing 
to the independence of the directly elected officials.
12   
The position regarding the judicial power of Rome is more confusing 
because of terminological imprecision, the multiple roles of magistrates and the 
appellate jurisdiction of the legislative assemblies. The praetors dealt with 
civil cases and original jurisdiction in criminal cases was exercised by other 
magistrates, in particular,  the  quaestors and the  curule aediles. Later, the  popular 
assemblies gained appellate jurisdiction in respect of  crimes  and serious 
disobedience to magistrates. The few recorded  instances of the exercise of 
original jurisdiction by the assemblies are probably cases where the magistrates 
chose to prejudge guilt and to dispense with the formalities of trial and 
condemnation  in view of the inevitability of appeal.
13  Further confusion is 
caused by the key term  imperium, the power that belonged to the Roman 
consuls and later the emperors. Imperium in its broader sense signified the 
comprehensive power that encompassed  coercitio  and  iurisdictio  roughly 
corresponding to executive and judicial powers. In its alternative narrower sense, 
imperium referred to military command.
14 Supreme command of the military belonged 
unquestionably to the consuls but they enjoyed the wider imperium only nominally. In 
the later republic,  the whole of criminal and civil justice (with  the minor 
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exception of market disputes decided by the  curule aediles), was exercised  by the 
judicial magistrates, the praetor urbanus and the praetor  peregrinus.
15 The  praetors   
were nominally executive officers but methodologically they behaved more like common law 
judges than members of modern quasi-judicial tribunals. 
16 There was one interesting 
difference in their methods. Whereas the common law judges make adjustment to 
legal principle in the course of deciding cases, the praetors exhausted their discretion 
beforehand by issuing the famous praetorian edicts on the law. These edicts, issued on 
the assumption of office, stated the law that would guide the praetor in deciding cases 
that he would hear during his term of office. More importantly, they  served as 
precedents to successors in office. Consequently, a body of stable and known 
edictal norms developed providing a high degree of stability and 
predictability of decisions.  
Polybius,  a  contemporary Greek historian,  found  in  the  Republic  a mixed-
constitution in the sense of a mix of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. He wrote:  
The three kinds of government that I spoke of above all shared in the control of 
the Roman state. And such fairness and propriety in all  respects was 
shown in the use of these three elements for drawing up the constitution and in 
its subsequent administration that it was impossible  even for a native to 
pronounce with certainty whether the whole system  was aristocratic, 
democratic or monarchical. This was indeed only natural. For if one fixed 
one's eyes on the power of the consuls, the constitution seemed completely 
monarchical or royal; if on that of the  senate it seemed again to be 
aristocratic; and when one looked at the power of the masses, it seemed clearly 
to be a democracy.
17 
 
Although Polybius portrayed the Roman Republic in terms of the Greek theory of 
the mixed government, his description of the Republican Constitution revealed a 
system of separation or distribution of powers. The consuls, we are told, lead the 
armies and are in control of the administration of all  public affairs. The other 
magistrates are treated as subordinates. Their functions in  relation to the 
summoning of assemblies and the preparation of the legislative agenda are 
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mentioned but it is their military and executive roles that are emphasised.
18 The 
senate's functions are mainly the control of finance and diplomacy. (Bk VI, Ch 13). 
And the people are identified as the most important constitutional organ with its 
electoral, appellate and legislative powers. (Bk VI Ch 14). 
These constitutional arrangements did not result in a clear tripartite separation 
of powers but produced a Rechststaat, a law governed state in which, according to 
historian Loewenstein, the ‘citizen enjoyed a security of  existence equal to any 
modern constitutional order’ being ‘protected against illegality by the scrupulous 
observance of the rule of law enjoined  on all officials’.
19 The citizen was 
protected from arbitrary arrest and punishment and her property was secure to 
the extent that mighty Augustus preferred to change the original design for his 
forum to avoid expropriating private property’. 
20  The diffusion thesis alone 
cannot explain Roman liberty. Although the Republic achieved an extensive dispersal 
of powers it did not effect an elegant tripartite division. Officials and assemblies had 
dual roles and above all the senate’s influence was  in  inverse proportion to its 
constitutionally established prerogatives and spanned all branches of government. It 
controlled the magistrates who were ex officio senators and after the inclusion of the 
plebeian aristocracy in the senate it was able to manipulate the legislative assemblies. 
Loewenstein observes that ‘In all history there is hardly a more telling illustration 
of the cleavage between  constitutional nominalism and political reality’.
21 
McIlwain says, that ‘the constitutional difference and inter-relation of the senate 
and populus were roughly analogous to those existing between a modern 
English government and an English parliament.’ 
22 Like the modern parliamentary 
executive the Roman senate, had a hand in both administration and legislation. The critical 
difference was that unlike the modern cabinet, it did not confuse the methodologies of law 
making and administration by procuring for the executive, law making power. Nor did the 
senate promote the making of law for the individual case as the modern executive does 
under delegated authority. The recognition of legislation as a distinct function that 
could be performed only in the legislative assemblies was at the  heart of 
republican constitutionalism. Not even the  dictator appointed to govern  in 
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emergencies could legislate.
23 The promulgation of the Twelve Tables epitomised the 
idea that the law  should be known and stable and invulnerable to executive 
manipulation. The code was  compiled following plebeian complaints that the 
knowledge of the law was withheld  from them and that its administration was 
consequently arbitrary and tyrannical.
24The fact that a separated judiciary was not of 
paramount concern to the ancients is at least partly due to the clarity with which 
they understood the methodological thesis that whosoever holds power must 
exercise the power in the manner appropriate to it. In the Roman Republic 
there was no authority above the law and there was no person or group whose 
unilateral will (voluntas) was the law. Although the Republic was short lived its 
constitutional legacy endures. 
The Republic ended with the principate of Augustus.  The principate 
maintained republican forms but the successors of Augustus created the 
dominate, an authentically totalitarian system. Under the doctrine adopted by the 
Roman emperors, the monarch was immune from the law (princeps legibus solutus est) 
and by the fiction of popular consent his will was the law. (Quod principi placet 
legis habet vigorem cum  lege regia populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et 
potestatem conferat). The idea that the monarch ruled by the grace of God (Rex Dei gratia) 
came to prominence during the papacy of St Gregory and it was inevitably employed 
in the service of royal absolutism.  The dominate lasted in the east until the fall of the 
Byzantine Empire.  The absolutist theory went into abeyance in  Europe with the 
fall of the Byzantine Empire. Its re-emergence roughly  coincided with the 
formation of territorial kingdoms and the rise of absolute monarchies in western 
Europe.  It was used to legitimise the abrogation of feudal rights and the 
consolidation of royal authority.  
The ideal of government under law achieved by the methodological 
separation of legislative and executive functions did not die with the dominate 
for three major reasons. Firstly, the ideal was central to the organisation of 
the Germanic kingships that the Roman empire never fully controlled. The 
ouster of Romulus Augustulus by Odovacar in 476 and the re-emergence of barbarian 
autonomy resuscitated the legal tradition of the Germanic tribes. The central idea in 
this tradition was the antithesis of voluntas principi. The German emperors never had 
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the capacity to impose absolute rule over its principalities.  Secondly, the 
disintegration of the Western Empire and the pre-occupation of the 
succeeding German emperors with affairs north of the Alps enabled a few 
great cities of Italy to create republics in the image of Rome. Thirdly, the 
cause of constitutionalism and the separation of powers found a remarkable 
champion in Marsilius of Padua who challenged the theological case for royal 
absolutism expressed in its most sophisticated form in the writings of St 
Thomas Aquinas. I will consider these causes in reverse order.  
 
Theocratic monarchy and the Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua 
According to the theocratic conception of monarchy, the king derived his 
authority directly from God. Scriptural support for the theory was drawn from the 
account of the founding of Jewish kingship, the duty of obedience to authority and 
the Pauline declaration Gratia Dei sum id quod sum. 
25 There is no fundamental 
inconsistency between the grace of God and republican institutions as Marsilius 
argued in the Defensor Pacis. However, the Roman emperors, the Imperial Popes 
and the absolute monarchs of later Europe claimed legitimacy of their authority 
from God without the mediacy of human agencies. The theocratic view was the 
undisputed doctrine of the later Empire after the ecclesiastical endorsement of 
St Gregory.
26 Gregory regarded the rulers of his time as being set above the people 
by God.  Authority for this position was almost certainly  Romans,  13, 1 -5. 
Resistance to rule was resistance to God. It is not for man to judge the ruler, for 
the guilty ruler misuses God's power, not man's. The association of law with the 
unilateral will of the ruler came at the expense  of the institutional diffusion of 
legislative and executive organs of government. The methodological distinction was 
not altogether abandoned as the monarch under the theocratic political theory was 
bound to rule justly and justice required the rule of law. However, the new limits on 
power were different from the old.  Whereas the old limitations were derived 
from the idea of law as folkways and the feudal bonds, the new limits were to be 
found in the divine nature of authority. The early patristic doctrine of the Church 
held that coercive authority is the result of sin. Obedience is a part of Christian 
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duty, as authority is installed as a penalty (and remedy) for sin. However, with 
the reception of Aristotle into ecclesiastical scholarship, the conception of the 
state became more positive and the ruler was attributed the moral goals of the 
church. The theocratic view of the state found its  fullest expression in the 
writings of Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) who argued that political hierarchy is 
not retributive but natural. (Summa Theologica 3-4)
27  The government played the 
role of the rational mind, directing the body of the multitude to its common 
good. This was the reversal of the traditional idea that government’s first 
duty is to enforce the law that exists independently of the ruler’s will. Form 
the theocratic viewpoint the ruler's function is not only to apply the law but to 
determine its content for in the natural order of things the ruler is to the people, what 
the mind is to the body and what the Creator himself is to the universe. 
Aquinas considered the rule of one man as the best form of government. ‘A 
plurality of individuals will already require  some bond of unity before they can 
begin to rule... So it is better for one to rule rather than many who must first reach 
agreement.’(De Regimine Principum 1:2). 
28  He placed no constitutional limitations 
on the power of the prince. His promise to discuss precautions against tyranny 
never materialises. Where the prince  is elected he may be likewise deposed. But 
when there is no such hope, ‘recourse must be made to God the King of all, and the 
helper of all who call upon Him in the time of tribulation’. (De Regimine Principum 
1:66)
29  Aquinas rejected rebellion as a cure worse than the disease. The safeguard 
and remedies against tyranny were not constitutional but spiritual. The King was 
to  rule justly because of divine reward. ‘So great is the reward of heavenly 
blessedness promised to kings for the just exercise of their power, that they should 
strive with all care to avoid tyranny ... Nobody, however foolish and unbelieving 
they may be, can  fail to see the stupidity of losing so surpassing and eternal a 
reward for such fleeting and material satisfaction.’ (De Regimine Principum 1:10).
30 
The prince is the source of human law. And as shepherd and protector of the flock 
was entitled to ‘complete plenitude of power’. (Commentary on the Sentences   4:24)
31 
‘The interpretation of  laws and dispensation from observance belongs to him who 
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made the law.’ (Summa  contra Gentes 3:76)
32 Elsewhere: ‘it pertains to the king to be 
over all human offices and to direct them through the authority of his rule’. (De 
Regimine Principum  1:15)
33Aquinas thus unequivocally rejected the diffusion thesis of 
the separation of powers doctrine without explicitly rejecting the methodological 
thesis. Elsewhere Aquinas is equivocal when he speaks in favour of mixed government 
closely followed by the re-iteration that regnum is best ‘if not corrupted.’ (De Regno 
I:II).
34 Yet his explicit statements did little to help the cause of the separation of 
powers.  
The ascendancy of the theocratic conception of government failed to extinguish 
constitutionalism  from medieval thought and practice. The theocratic conception 
remained under challenge from philosophical opposition, the force of tradition and 
the pressures to make government predictable and accountable. The philosophical 
challenge materialised out of the significant political issue of the times, the conflict 
between papal  and secular authority, which  reached its decisive phase in the 
controversy between Phillip the Fair of France and Boniface VIII.  The claims to 
papal sovereignty were met by  counter claims of  independent royal authority in 
secular matters, derived  from the will of God, but  mediated by the p eople. More 
importantly resentment at papal absolutism provoked  a challenge to the idea of 
sovereign power ‘on the ground that it was intrinsically tyrannous whenever it existed 
and need to be tempered and limited by  representation and consent’.
35  The great 
champion of this view was  Marsilius  of Padua (1280-1343), whose extraordinary 
religious-political tract Defensor Pacis has earned him the reputation of an architect of 
the reformation, the Machiavellian republic and even modern democracy.
36  
Marsilius, physician, soldier, scientist, theologian, Italian patriot and for 
a period Rector of the University of Paris regarded papal power as the cause of 
Italian disunity. Owing to his resentment of the papacy, he was not satisfied 
with the separation of the spiritual from the temporal but sought to justify the 
subjection of the church to civil government. This he could do only be redefining 
the concepts of  state and law. Marsilius was an Aristotelian but unlike Thomas 
Aquinas thought in the Averroist tradition of empirical rather than theological 
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naturalism. He adopted from Aristotle, the organic view of the state and the causes 
of its evolution but unlike the Thomists regarded these  causes as earthly and 
demonstrable and therefore outside the purview of philosophy.
37 As a man of faith, he 
did not deny the undemonstrable but maintained that matters known only by revelation 
cannot be included in the science of  government. In politics, the Church is not 
superior to human authority. The function of the Church is no more than ‘to ensure 
the goodness of human acts both individual and civil, on  which depend almost 
completely, the quiet or tranquility of communities and finally the sufficient life 
in the present world’.
38 
Marsilius denied the theocratic justification of absolutism claiming that in 
God's design, it is the people who are the effective cause of government. ‘God does 
not always act immediately; indeed in most cases, nearly everywhere, he establishes 
governments by means of human minds, to which he has granted the discretionary 
will for such establishment’.
39 Likewise, Marsilius denied the ruler's authority to 
legislate by grace although he acknowledged that laws, such as the Mosaic code 
were sometimes handed to man  directly by God. ‘The primary and proper 
efficient cause of the law, is the people or the whole body of citizens, or the 
weightier part thereof, through its election or will expressed by words in the 
general assembly of the citizens, commanding or determining that something 
be done or omitted with regard to human civil acts, under a temporal pain or 
punishment.’
40 
In chapter XIII of his first discourse, Marsilius advances his theory of 
legislation. In the Aristotlean tradition he regards legislation as a science that involves 
‘investigation, discovery and examination of the standards, the future laws or 
statutes’.
41 He commends therefore  the election of prudent and experienced 
citizens to the legislature but maintains that the ultimate legislative authority 
must remain with the whole body of citizens. The institutional and 
methodological separation of legislative and executive powers is central to 
Marsilius’ theory of the state. It reflects the pre-modern lack of emphasis on 
the separation of executive and judicial power.  A ruler's task is to govern 
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according to the law made by the legislator. ‘Such a thing is the law when the ruler 
is directed to make civil judgements in accordance with it.’ 
42 In the idealised 
scheme of the state, the legislator leaves nothing to ‘the discretion of the judge, 
because the judgement of the legislator, that is, the law, is not partial, that is, it is 
not made on account of some one particular man, but is concerned with future and 
universal matters’.
43Marsilius thus made a radical attack on the dominant theory of 
his times which reposed all embracing power in the ruler by divine right. By denying 
the ruler legislative functions, he restored to political thought, the Aristotelian 
concepts of the rule of law and the separation of the functions of governing and 
legislating.  
Italian republicanism 
After the fall of the Western Empire parts of Italy fell under the 
suzerainty of German emperors of the north while imperial Popes rules 
Latium and Romagna. During the twelfth century, the German emperors’ 
preoccupation with affairs north of the A lps allowed the communes of 
Northern Italy and Tuscany to gain autonomy gradually.  They began to 
appoint consuls and establish councils who gradually gained ascendancy 
over the bishops. The communes ultimately became city states. Although 
most of them ended in despotism, a small group of cities including 
Florence, Venice, Sienna, Lucca and Pisa survived as republics. The 
wealth and influence of Florence and Venice ensured that the republican 
ideal continued to challenge the absolutist theories of the time.  
The Florentine republic survived to the end of the 15
th century 
despite periods of conflict between rival oligarchies. Florence swayed 
between popular republicanism and aristocratic republicanism but on the 
whole, it is fair to say that the pendulum favoured the latter and that 
under Medici rule Florence resembled at times a principate more than a 
republic. The Medicis though were too astute to claim absolute power 
and preferred to influence the council and senate while maintaining 
republican forms. The t roubles of Florence do not detract form its 
successful resistance to imperial, papal and local despotism. These 
troubles ironically produced an intellectual legacy for the cause of 
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republicanism and hence for the separation of powers in the form of the 
great historical-political commentaries of Leonardo Bruni ( Laudatio 
Florentinae Urbis.), Niccolò Machiavelli’s ( Il Principe  and Istorie 
Florentine and Francesco Guicciardini (Storia d’Italia) .
44  
It was Venice that most successfully revived republican 
government and its stability, freedom and prosperity were attributed to 
the imitation of Rome. Before the  Serrata in 1297, the government 
consisted of the  arengo (the assembly of all people), the 300 strong 
Consiglio Maggiore (the Great Council)selected by the assembly, the 
Senate of Forty, a ducal council of six and the Doge elected for life. The 
Great Council appointed other councils, passed legislation and through 
the Senate served as the highest court. The Senate also was primarily 
responsible for drafting and presenting legislation. The ducal council 
ensured that the  Doge acted according to law and advice. The scheme 
was one of mixed government that minimised the potential for arbitrary 
rule by ensuring that legislative and executive functions remained 
methodologically and institutionally separate.  After the  Serrata the 
Consiglio Maggiore became a wholly patrician body while the senate 
became the place of real power taking on the functions of the old 
Council. Although the democratic element declined, Venice continued as 




The Germanic peoples in the manner of most tribes regarded the law as residing in the 
collective wisdom of the people. The law was the inherited body of rules by which 
the peaceful life of the tribe was carried on.
45 It represented folkways and not the will 
of  rulers. Three consequences flowed form this concept of law. Firstly, the law 
could not be made but was there to be discovered and declared. Secondly, since the 
ruler could not make law, he was obliged to administer the kingdom according to 
its laws. Thirdly, since the law was an emanation from the people (volk) its alteration 
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required the consent of the people. 
The folk law inevitably became modified in the process of articulation and 
application but the theoretical legitimacy of positive enactments required the actual 
or nominal participation of the people, or of those traditionally speaking on 
their behalf. Royal edicts commenced with such words as ‘because the law is made 
with the consent of the people and by the declaration  of the king’.
46 Charlemagne’s 
recitation was ‘ Charles the Emperor  together with the bishops, abbots, counts, 
dukes, and all the faithful subjects of the Christian Church, and with their 
consent and counsel, has decreed the following  .... in order that each loyal 
subject, who has himself confirmed these decrees with his own hand, may do 
justice and in order that all his loyal subjects may desire to uphold the law’.
47 Early 
medieval thought in the Germanic and Frankish territories sharply distinguished the 
function of ruling from that of legislating. The king participated in both functions. 
The first was within his exclusive jurisdiction, but the second he performed in a 
wholly distinct, cooperative manner. Theoretically, the king's role was even less, 
being confined to the application of the law whereas the law itself  was 
determined by the people, with the king providing the authentication of the people's 
will. Thus Archbishop Hincmar was able to write to Lewis III in 879 that: ‘You 
have not chosen me to be a prelate of the Church, but I and my colleagues, with 
the other loyal subjects of God and your ancestors, have chosen you to rule the 
kingdom on the condition that you shall keep the law’.
48  
Law as folkways did not mean democracy. Consent of the people to legal 
change was in practice the consent of the barons. The institutional framework was 
not democracy but feudal obligation. The baron by bond of fealty was the protector 
and spokesman of his tenants. He received in return their loyalty and traditional 
services. The barons were by similar bond entitled to the monarch’s protection  in 
return for loyalty and services. Mutual obligations and rights could not be 
unilaterally changed. When obligations were dishonoured, entitlements were 
forfeited giving rise to the right of resistance, a right that belonged not only 
to the barons but also to every freeman.
49 As Kern observes the fundamental idea 
was that ‘the ruler and ruled alike are bound to the law; the fealty of both parties is 
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in reality fealty to the law; the law is the point where the duties of both of them 
intersect. If, therefore, the king breaks the law, he automatically forfeits any 
claim to the obedience of his subjects’.
50  
The judicial power of the community was as yet indistinct from executive 
power as the law was applied and enforced through the royal courts. Consequently it 
was natural, that the folk law that was unalterable by royal will should nevertheless 
change gradually through judicial interpretation and application to cases in the manner 
of the English common law.
51 To look for the separation of executive and judicial 
functions in order to locate  the historical antecedents of the doctrine, is to 
misdirect the inquiry. Theoretically, as well as historically, the separation of law 
and government preceded the creation  of judicial independence. Judicial power 
serves to ensure that  actions accord with the law and is consequential to the 
separation of law and action. What we observe in the early middle ages is the 
pronounced methodological differentiation of lawmaking and governance and 
the beginnings of a diffusion that leads to the evolution of a distinct judicial organ.  
The early medieval conceptions of law and monarchy were eclipsed for a period by 
theocratic political theories.  Yet those concepts, being part of the popular 
culture, persisted throughout the period of regal absolutism, and were 
eventually harnessed to the constitutional  movement of modern Europe.  As 
Ullmann observes they ‘provided a living bridge between the primitive European 
period and the new Europe’. 
52 
  
The Ancient Constitution of England 
The most important feature of medieval constitutionalism is identified by Mcllwain 
as the distinction between gubernaculum, the government of the realm and jurisdictio, the 
power to determine the rights of subjects. This distinction was at the heart of the 
Ancient Constitution of England. McIlwain states on the authority of Bracton that 
only the ‘acts  of government strictly defined are in the hands of the king 
alone.’
53 Within  the narrower field of government, ‘the king is not only the sole 
administrator, but he  has of right and must have all powers needed for an 
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effective administration.’
54  Definition of right on  the other hand, share the 
character of immemorial  custom and these, Bracton says, ‘since they have been 
approved by the consent of those using them and confirmed by oath of kings, can 
neither be changed nor destroyed without the common consent of all those with 
whose counsel and consent they have been promulgated.’
55 Elsewhere, Bracton had 
stated that the king ‘has it in his power in his own person to observe and to make his 
subjects observe the enactments and decrees and assizes provided, approved and 
sworn to in his realm.’ The implication here that the king had the discretion to 
exempt himself from the laws puzzles Mcllwain. He thinks that the words ‘leges et 
constitutiones et assisas’ used by Bracton  refer only to administrative orders as Bracton 
notably did not include within the king’s power consuetudo (custom) which at 
the time was the class of law that determined rights.
56  The king's authority 
pertained to the administration of the realm (pertinet ad regni gubernaculum). It was only 
within the sphere of government  that the king could disregard the law as being 
merely the vis directiva of Thomas Aquinas or the moral inhibition implied in the 
Digna vox.  In jurisdiction, the king was bound by his oath to proceed according to law.  The 
Ancient Constitution may have been partly mythical, but its influence on politics 
was real.
57 Monarchs claimed their powers from immemorial custom and the rival 
theory of the king as a source of law by divine right did not emerge as a significant 
force until the claims of James I. When it did, it created decades of civil strife before 
being extinguished by the revolution of 1688.  
The Ancient Constitution was essentially an incarnation of the 
constitutionalism of feudal kingships. In England, the law as local folkways became 
the common law through centralisation of the administration of justice by Henry II.  
The monarch was bound by this law and indeed owed his authority to this law. The 
courts were royal courts and judges served at royal pleasure. However, as the 
monarch was bound by oath and custom to proceed according to law, the royal courts 
had to do the same and in theory and practice (evidenced by the plea rolls surviving 
from the period) they were not directed by the royal will.
 58 The highest court of all 
was the High Court of Parliament which was the curia regis of the Norman kings. 
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It was the royal court in the old sense, the council that advised the monarch on 
matters of state and served as the highest court of justice. The idea of the law as 
custom left little need f or legislative activity in the modern sense and whatever 
democratic element that was present in Parliament served only to safeguard 
customary rights. There is a weak diffusion of powers but a strong methodological 
separation of governance and adjudication. T he law is associated not with the 
legislature but with the courts.  Parliament’s legislative power is rudimentary arising 
from its status as the high court. William Lambard wrote in 1591, ‘It hath jurisdiction 
in such cases which have need of helpe, and for which there is no helpe by any Law, 
already in force’.
59 The rise of the House of Commons responsive to popular 
aspirations and the establishment of other superior courts combined to transform 
Parliament into a legislative assembly although it never lost its judicial power. 
Law as custom gave way to the still medieval idea of law that is alterable, but only 
with the consent of the people’s representatives assembled in Parliament.  Royal 
assent was necessary to make new law but the crown lacked the prerogative to make 
law unilaterally except in extraordinary situations and as authorised by customary 
prerogative. Conversely, the legislative power of Parliament did not extend to the 
administration of the realm which remained exclusively in the hands of the monarch.  
The Ancient Constitution prevailed  until the end of the 16th century 
despite the so called Tudor despotism of Henry VIII and Elizabeth. It drew great 
strength from the common law that had no parallel in feudal Germany. The 
reforms of  Henry II and the establishment of the Courts of Common Pleas, King’s 
Bench and the Exchequer were instrumental in the creation of an authoritative well 
documented body of laws applying throughout the realm. The subject’s rights were 
no longer based on uncertain custom but on recorded precedents. There was also the 
spectacular irony of Parliament's powers  being enhanced even as it 
succumbed to the will of the Tudor monarchs. The success that Henry had in 
bending Parliament to his will by force of personality  rendered the formal 
usurpation of power unnecessary. Henry made Parliament do what was unimaginable at 
the time including the enactment in  1539, of the infamous Statute of Proclamations 
which clothed the king with the authority to override the laws of Parliament by  royal  
proclamation. The Tudors left Parliament stronger than they found it. Stewart Fay 
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was not far off the mark when he wrote that ‘Ironically enough, Henry the Despot must 
stand god-father to the modern doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament.’
60  Henry 
(and Elizabeth after him) by making Parliament the  vehicle of his will, 
strengthened Parliament's own claims to sovereignty.  
 
The unravelling of the Ancient Constitution and its causes 
The seventeenth century crisis of the constitution was hastened by the Stuarts 
who unlike their Tudor predecessors relied for their ambitions on prerogative 
and not Parliament. However, even without the Stuart excesses, the Ancient 
Constitution was not likely to survive the religious conflict and the gathering 
tide of social and economic change in the country.  The equilibrium of the 
Ancient Constitution was based on the stability of the agrarian society connected by 
the feudal tenancy system. The limits of gubernaculum were always imprecise but 
this was not a major problem in feudal conditions where the concerns of government 
rarely touched the daily lives of the people. The growth of commerce created a new 
property owning class and made the cities much more important in the political 
equation. The new economy expanded the range of private interests and also the 
government’s regulatory role, bringing the spheres of gubernaculum and jurisdictio 
into frequent conflict. There was a need for a clearer constitutional demarcation 
of authority than the old separation of powers based on ancient precedent. A 
creative  interpretation of the distinction between  gubernaculum and jurisdictio could 
have led to the establishment of the right of Parliament to legislate generally 
on matters of public concern whilst reserving to the king the function of governing 
in the narrower  sense of administering the realm and providing justice through 
independent courts. Such a resolution was prevented by the irreconcilable religious 
and political aims of the Stuart monarchy and the protestant majority in Parliament. 
The settlement was eventually achieved by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 but not 
before decades of often bloody strife. In the century leading to the revolution, the 
uncertainties concerning the limits of gubernaculum precipitated conflicts on 
four fronts – monopolies, prerogative courts, taxation and the use of the power 
of dispensation and suspension.  
Monopolies 
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A major confrontation regarding monopolies had erupted in the closing  years of 
Elizabeth's reign. The grant of monopolies was a royal prerogative justified as a 
means of regulating national trade and as patents for promoting innovation 
but unsurprisingly it became a method of rewarding friends and raising royal revenue 
through sale to merchants. Parliament  regarded the latter practice as one of 
unauthorised taxation. It was also clear that  indiscriminate creation of 
monopolies was interfering with common law rights, of  which Parliament 
regarded itself the guardian. These practices raised the classic  problem of 
executive discretion to vitiate  the law  - a problem which throughout history 
invited the solution of separating government from the function of making  law. So 
long as this prerogative remained within the bounds of its original purpose it did not 
appear to undermine the supremacy of the law. Perhaps more significantly, Parliament's 
perception of what constituted an interference with rights was changing with its new 
composition. Earlier Parliaments comprised mainly of landowners whose interests 
were largely unaffected by monopolies. The entry of  wealthy traders into the 
national political life brought corresponding changes to Parliament and its areas 
of concern. Monopolies became a contentious issue. Elizabeth astutely realised that 
the prerogative itself was threatened and at the eleventh h our, as Parliament 
debated action, she proclaimed the cancellation of  many of the offending 
monopolies and submitted others to judicial review. However, under James I and 
Charles I, the sale of commercial monopolies became a revenue source for the Crown 
whose financial requests were strenuously questioned and often denied by a hostile 
Parliament.    
Prerogative courts 
The incompatibility of the old prerogatives with new rights was evident on a wider 
scale in the use of  prerogative courts. The king's prerogative was considered 
absolute in foreign relations, in matters of war and peace, and in times of civil 
turmoil and insurrection. The last mentioned subject was treated by the Tudors as 
sufficiently elastic to include matters which today would fall within the general 
field of law and order. It was in this area, that the gubernaculum made its greatest 
inroads into what may be described as the strict province of legislation. These 
incursions for the most part were not effected by royal decree but by the ‘judicial’ 
activity of the king's council, sitting in the starred chamber of Westminster 
Palace. The Star Chamber as it came to be known derived its jurisdiction, not from   26 
the common law, but from prerogative. It was  official in composition and its 
methods were inquisitorial, often involving torture. It was effectively a policing 
arm of the king restrained only by its own opinion of the limits of prerogative. 
The Star Chamber  legislated into existence numerous offences against 
governmental authority  and public order. Many present day offences against 
established authority, the  processes of the law and the public tranquility 
originated in the Star Chamber. Treason and sedition were punished as direct 
challenges to royal authority. Counterfeiting was made an offence to safeguard 
the king's prerogative to coin money. Perjury was recognised to cleanse the judicial 
process and blasphemy for the avoidance of religious strife and the protection of 
the established Church. Even  libels were punished on the grounds that it 
would protect the king's peace by  removing a common cause of duelling. The 
religious counterpart of the Star Chamber was the Court of High Commission. 
Like the Star Chamber, the High Commission exercised the monarch's ill-defined 
prerogative, in this case her powers as head of the Church. Initially the legislative 
activity of these ‘courts’ and their unusual methods of dispensing justice caused 
no public concern. In fact, the Star Chamber proved popular for fighting crime 
and its willingness to punish even the  powerful.  So long as government 
occupied a narrow space summary justice was unlikely to interfere with property 
rights or religious freedom.  It was inevitable though that the increasing 
sophistication of the state would bring the administration of the realm into 
conflict  with rights. The first major collision occurred, not with proprietary rights, 
but with religious rights. The king considered the regulation of religion as a 
matter of high prerogative whereas for the puritans the religious freedom was not 
negotiable.  The religious schism hastened the inevitable conflict between the 
uncertain prerogative and citizen’s rights and freedoms. The Star Chamber and 
the High Commission were put to use in enforcing religious conformity and so became 
dreaded instruments of royal tyranny. The authority of the Star Chamber and of 
the High Commission combined the power to make law, to adjudge persons, and to 
execute sentences, the very hallmark of tyranny.  
Parliament abolished the Court of High Commission in 1640 and the Star 
Chamber in 1641 and prohibited the re-establishment of similar courts. The 
prohibition was confirmed later  by the Ecclesiastical Causes Act, 1661. 
However, when James II revived the Court of High Commission with very similar   27 
powers it was evident that the monarch did not hold himself bound by Acts that 
curbed the prerogative.
61 The constitutional precedents did not support Parliament’s 
power to abrogate prerogatives or to define its boundaries. The court proceeded to 
implement the king's religious policy in disregard of legislation. Henry Compton, the 
Bishop of London, was suspended by the court for refusing to discipline summarily 
John Sharp accused of giving anti-Catholic sermons
62 and Dr John Peachell, the 
Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge was dismissed when the university senate refused to 
admit Alban Francis, a Benedictine Monk, to a higher degree.
63 In each case, the 
charge concerned disobedience of royal instructions and not the law of the land. 
Extra-parliamentary taxation 
The next major area of contention regarding the prerogative concerned extra--
parliamentary taxation. This particular use of the prerogative was partly a reaction to 
parliamentary intransigence. If the uncertainty of the limits of prerogative power 
invited royal inroads into  the domain of the law, the converse proved true of 
Parliament's power to control the king's finances. In the 12th chapter of the Magna 
Carta King John had agreed that ‘no scutage or aid shall be imposed on our kingdom 
unless by common counsel of our kingdom except for ransoming our person, for making 
our eldest son a knight and for marrying our eldest daughter once; and for them there 
shall not be levied more than a reasonable aid’. This rule requiring the consent of 
the barons (and  later the commons) for taxation w as one which no monarch 
successfully defied. In feudal  conditions the king was expected to finance 
government through private revenue. Public  authority was akin to private 
possession.
64 The king's revenue was derived from his personal wealth and from 
feudal dues paid to him as the real and ultimate owner of all land in the kingdom. 
‘The  King enriched himself at the expense of his lords and the lords 
recompensed themselves at the expense of their tenants’.
65 A demand made outside the 
feudal contract was a violation of rights and therefore required consent  of the 
barons for satisfaction. This system was complemented by the organisation of 
government which left significant responsibility for local administration and 
law enforcement in the hands of the local manors. 
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With the centralisation of government and the disintegration of the feudal 
system owing to economic causes, the royal revenue rarely matched expenditure. 
When England became a commercial and political power in Europe with  inevitable 
military involvements, taxation became a regular necessity. Taxation was a clear 
violation of proprietary rights and hence required consent. But the right to 
withhold consent was hollow without the right to question the need and purposes 
of  taxation. The more dependent the king became on Parliamentary subsidies, the 
more he exposed the government  to scrutiny.  he Tudors obtained subsidies from 
Parliament by persuasion and intimidation. In contrast, irreconcilable differences 
between king and parliament became the order of the S tuart period. James' 
neglect of the Protestant cause in Europe, his attempted rapprochement with Spain 
and his policy of toleration at home were matters which the puritan majority in 
Parliament found impossible to ignore although they were within the province of the 
prerogative. James' Spanish policy also affected the Indies trade, a prize sought 
by English merchants. (Masse 1968:108)  Nor did James help his own cause by 
alarming Parliament with his claims to absolute sovereignty. These claims were 
rejected by Parliament in the Form of Apology and Satisfaction, and in the protestation of 
1610, Parliament asserted its privilege to debate any matter concerning ‘the public 
and his right or state’. Parliament, as yet without permanent existence, was 
summoned and dismissed at royal will. As the mutual mistrust grew, the king sought 
to govern without Parliament, and Parliament whenever summoned, resorted to the 
practice of  demanding the redress of accumulated grievances before discussing 
subsidies. Parliament was gradually perfecting its capacity to frustrate policy. 
The king's response was to turn to the prerogative as a means of raising revenue. 
These measures, of which the most notorious were the Impositions, created further 
grievances and completed the vicious cycle which was eroding the balance of the 
Ancient Constitution.  The pattern continued in the reign of Charles I as the 
government sought independence from Parliament through prerogative action. 
Tonnage and Poundage, the forced loan, free billeting of troops and the exaction of 
ship money in peace time entered the Parliament's growing list of grievances. The 
problem of the uncertain limits of the prerogative concerning revenue was 
illustrated in Bates Case, Darnel’s Case and the Ship Money Case.   29 
In  Bates' C ase,
66  the Exchequer Court  upheld the legality of the infamous 
Impositions (charges added to customs duty without the authority of Parliament), 
reasoning that customs duties concerned trade and foreign relations and so were 
within the exclusive preserve of the king. Darnel's Case
67  and the Ship Money Case 
68 
were decided on technicalities though  they each involved a flagrant abuse of the 
prerogative. Darnel, who was imprisoned  for refusing to pay the forced loan, was 
denied the Habeus Corpus on the ground that the court could not look behind the 
king's writ. Hampden was refused relief against the exaction of ship money in peace 
time on the ground the court had no competence to question the king's judgement that 
an emergency existed.  These cases demonstrated that the prerogative was 
operating in areas and in ways that were no longer compatible with the new 
expectations in a changing society.  
Dispensation and suspension 
An effective weapon in the king's armoury was the power of dispensation which had 
been left unaffected by the restoration settlement. This power was generally 
considered limited to cases where dispensation had no effect on the rights of 
third parties or the public interest.
69 However, its amplitude was demonstrated when 
in 1686 the Kings Bench upheld the power to dispense with the Test Act. The Test 
Act disqualified from civil and military office any person who failed to take the 
oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance and had not received the sacrament of the 
Church of England. The king used his power of  dispensation to appoint 
Roman Catholics to public office. When Edward Hales, the Lieutenant of the 
Tower became a Roman Catholic and the king gave him dispensation from the Test 
Act, he was prosecuted and convicted at the Assizes but was acquitted by the 
King’s Bench. In his judgment, the Chief Justice overruled the reservations on 
this power expressed in Thomas v Sorrel and in the strongest possible terms 
endorsed the king’s power to dispense with the law. The king, he proclaimed 
was a sovereign prince and the laws of England were his laws. Therefore it is 
‘an inseparable prerogative in the kings of England, to dispense with penal laws in 
particular cases, and upon particular necessary reasons … and of those reasons and 
those necessities, the king himself is sole judge: and then, which is consequent upon 
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all’. He insisted that ‘this is not a trust invested in, or granted to the king by the 
people, but the ancient remains of the sovereign power and prerogative of the 
kings of England; which never yet was taken from them, nor can be’. 
70 
A clearer rejection of the principle of the ancient separation of powers was 
hardly possible. The ruling emboldened James to use the wider and more contentious 
prerogative of suspension. In April 1687 he issued his first  Declaration of 
Indulgence which effectively suspended the penal laws against Catholics and 
dissenters. In April 1688, he re-issued the Declaration and ordered it to be read from 
pulpits. When seven bishops protested this measure in a petition to the king, they 
were accused of challenging the royal authority and prosecuted for seditious 
libel. The scope of the prerogative was not before the court as the main issues were 
whether the subject could question the king's action outside Parliament and whether 
the bishops acted with  libellous intent. Of the four judges, only Justice Powell 
ventured to deny the existence of the prerogative and to place the case squarely 
on that issue. A partisan London jury  acquitted the bishops but the case failed to 
overturn Gedden v Hales. 
71 
The king's prerogatives as the head of the church survived the restoration 
and remained critically important to the main political issue of the time which was the 
independence from Rome. James intended to restore in the longer term the 
episcopal authority to the Roman church Roman Catholics, and in the shorter 
term, to ensure ecclesiastical conformity with his religious policy. The control 
of the clergy was also crucial for the reason that the great centres of learning, 
which alone supplied credible candidates for high office, were ecclesiastically 
governed and therefore under Protestant control. James therefore set up a Court of 
High Commission with power to discipline all clergymen and academics and to 
make and re-make the statutes of universities and colleges. 
The threat posed by the legislative prerogative was accentuated by the absence 
of constitutional protection of judicial independence. Judges served at the king's 
pleasure, a fact which had great bearing on  the outcomes of politically significant 
cases as illustrated by the sacking of Francis Pemberton. As Holdsworth observed, 
‘it was quite certain that a judge, who was both learned and honest, would hold his 
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seat on the bench by a very precarious tenure; and that, in cases of great importance, 
very extraordinary means would be taken to ensure a favourable decision’
72.  
Pemberton who had shown judicial restraint in the trial of Lord Russell was 
considered unreliable for the royal cause in the Quo Warranto proceedings against 
the City of London. He was dismissed and Saunders, who had drawn up the crown's 
pleading in that case, was appointed to hear it! 
In the prelude to the civil war, Parliament led by Pym rolled back 
prerogatives by abolishing prerogative courts and prohibiting many of the extra 
parliamentary revenue practices. After Charles’ defeat in the civil war, the 
pendulum of power swung to Parliament with the abolition of the monarchy and 
the  rule of the Rump. Parliament, or what remained of it, exercised both the 
legislative  and executive powers. Royal excesses gave way to parliamentary 
excesses. Public disenchantment led first to the establishment of the Protectorate 
and eventually to the restoration of the monarchy with those powers left unaffected 
by Pym's sweeping  legislation. The remaining royal powers, however, were 
substantial and undefined and hence the causes of instability persisted to the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. 
The fundamental weakness of the constitution, exposed by the events of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was its lack of an underlying abstract principle 
-  a principle with sufficient generality which could resolve the new 
conflicts.  The constitution was cast in the feudal mould adapted to the 
protection of rights and liberties in feudal society. It remained anchored to the past 
by precedent even as the structure of society changed. The final collapse of the 
Ancient Constitution does not diminish the  significance of its historical 
achievement. At a time when nation after nation in Europe succumbed to absolute 
rule, the Ancient Constitution of England ensured that authority remained subject 
to law. 
 
Revolution Settlement and the restoration of the separation of powers 
The new constitutional order that emerged from the Revolution of 1688 is considered 
to have established the supremacy of Parliament. Yet, Parliament’s supremacy was 
established only in the field of law making. The revolution’s greater achievement was 
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the establishment for the first time in modern history of a tripartite separation of 
powers that substantially satisfied both the diffusion thesis and the methodological 
thesis of the doctrine.  (Cromwell’s Instrument of Government of 1653 arguably was 
a tripartite division but was never fully implemented and ended in military 
government in 1655.)  
The revolution of 1688 seems in hindsight to have been unavoidable. Certainly 
it was the only means of removing the cancer that had invaded the polity. The basic 
problem of the Ancient Constitution was that prerogative powers were ill-defined and 
in the context of the religious division and the circumstances of the post-feudal 
society their continued exercise by the king was untenable. It was not a problem 
that could have been legislatively  resolved even in the unlikely event that the 
king assented to such legislation. James II himself had demonstrated that, when it 
came to the exercise of prerogatives sanctioned by ancient usage, the legislation 
approved by his predecessors did not stand in his way. The constitutional crisis 
could have been resolved only by a decisive revolutionary act. As McIlwain 
observed, ‘Whether right or wrong the judgements of the courts had to be reversed 
by the nation, if not by the courts, or English liberty would have been lost entirely 
and possibly for ever’.
73 The revolutionary act was effected by the departure of 
James II, and the enactment of the Bill of Rights by the Convention Parliament. 
The convention  enthroned William and Mary on its own terms. Despite the 
declaratory  language of the Act, it was clear that the monarchs were 
appointed and the succession settled in violation of the existing law of succession 
and that their powers had been redefined by political act. It was a true Kelsenian 
revolution establishing a constitution derived from a new Grundnorm.  
Legislative power 
Apart from settling the succession to the throne, the Bill of Rights abolished 
the powers of suspension (s.1) and dispensation (s.2).  The Court of High 
Commission and all other commissions and courts of like nature were declared 
‘illegal and pernicious’ (s.3) and extra-parliamentary levies were declare illegal 
(s.4) The freedom of speech in Parliament was enshrined bringing to an end the 
danger of prosecution or civil suit for criticising the monarch. (s.9)  Finally there 
remained the question of the king's power to summon and dismiss Parliament at will, 
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which had been used to defeat legislative initiatives and even to  rule without 
Parliament. The Bill of Rights declared that ‘for the Redresse of all Grievances 
and for the amending strengthening and preserving of the Lawes Parlyaments 
ought to be held frequently’. (s.13) This principle was given practical effect by the 
Triennial Act, 1694.  The Bill of Rights thus established a clear division of 
powers between the executive and the legislature, by eliminating the 
uncertainties of the Ancient Constitution. 
Judicial power 
The insecurity of judicial tenure and the resulting exposure of the courts to royal 
manipulation was a significant cause of the conflict over the prerogatives. The crown 
won most of the judicial battles over prerogatives.  The dismissal of the fiercely 
independent Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke by James I in 1616 made this painfully 
clear. Charles II followed this precedent in dismissing Chief Justice Crewe of the 
Kings Bench in 1627, Chief Baron Walter of the Exchequer in 1630, and Chief Justice 
Heath in 1634. The separation and independence of the judiciary from the executive 
was completed by the Act of Settlement 1701 that established the constitutional 
principle (since adopted by most constitutional democracies) that judges do not serve 
at executive pleasure and the may only be removed by the representative assembly for 
good cause. However, the Bill of Rights addressed several legal deficiencies that 
allowed the crown to use the judicial process for its political ends.  The judicial 
practice of requiring excessive  bail often used as a means of nullifying the 
protection of the Habeus   Corpus Act was made illegal as were the imposition of 
excessive fines and the infliction of cruel and unusual  punishments. (s.10) 
James II had resorted to the remodelling of municipal corporations,  not only to 
influence Parliamentary elections but also to ensure the empanelling of  juries 
loyal to the crown.  The Bill of Rights declared that ‘Jurors ought to be  duely 
impannelled and returned and Jurors which passe upon Men in Trialls for High 
Treason ought to be Freeholders’. (s. 11) The immunity of jurors from prosecution had 
been established earlier in Bushell's Case where Chief Justice Vaughan established 
for all time the principle, that jurors are the sole judges of fact and therefore no 
judge can find them guilty of perjury by erroneous decision.
74 The crown practice of 
intervening in criminal proceedings by promising the reimbursement of fines and 
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forfeitures before conviction was prohibited by s.12. The most crippling 
procedural and evidentiary obstacles faced by defendants in political trials were 
removed by the Trial of Treasons Act 1696. 
Separation of Executive and legislative powers 
The provisions of the revolutionary settlement addressed specific abuses of the 
prerogative, and decreed specific solutions.  Cumulatively, they created a 
pronounced separation of the power to administer the realm, the power to make 
law and the power to dispense justice. The power of government 
(gubernaculum) remained with king in both law and fact. The power to make 
laws resided in Parliament. The judicial power vested in royal courts that were 
now royal in name and appointment but had independence from Crown and 
Parliament.  
The Crown was undoubtedly pre-eminent in foreign policy but depended on 
Parliament to finance its conduct. He was left many prerogatives but almost none of a 
legislative character. With respect to domestic affairs this position could have left 
him with  nothing but a police function. But that was not the intention of 
Parliament or of the nation. As Maitland observed, ‘It was no honorary president of 
a republic that the nation wanted, but a real working, governing king - a king with a 
policy - and such a king the  nation got’.
75 The royal executive was nothing like the 
current form of cabinet government. It was not until the Whig  administration of Sir 
Robert Walpole that ministers were drawn from a single party and even thereafter 
exceptions occurred. How did the king conduct the government without formal 
legislative powers? There is always an area within which state policy could be 
made and implemented without transgressing rights but increasingly, the conduct 
of public policy required the adjustment of established rights and duties and the 
creation of new ones by Parliament. Above all, policy had to be funded by Parliament 
which alone could impose taxes and appropriate revenue. Given the extinction of the 
legislative and financial prerogatives, Parliamentary cooperation  became not an 
occasional but a continuing necessity. The monarch retained the power to refuse 
assent to legislation and William III  employed this prerogative on several 
important occasions. However it was last used by Anne who withheld assent to the 
Scotch Militia Bill i n 1707. The great royal asset  on the contrary, was the 
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prerogative to appoint, direct and dismiss officers of the  state, to create 
sinecures and dispense government contracts. All of this carried the power 
to dispense patronage with which he could persuade parliamentary leaders 
to support policy. Thus, although the stick had been wrested from the king's hand, 
the carrot remained with him. Lovell writes ‘The extent to which the ruler was willing 
to allow a politician to allocate jobs and contracts made all the difference in the 
world to the loyalty he could command from his supporters, to his power as a 
parliamentary manager and hence as a minister. Without royal confidence, therefore, 
a politician  had little hope of building a following in Parliament to support his 
claims to office’.
76 The officers of the state therefore had to deliver Parliamentary 
support to the king and in that respect the king arguably had a measure of control 
over legislation.  But that control was far removed from the powers of suspension, 
dispensation,  proclamation and political trial which the king previously 
enjoyed. Not until the electoral reforms and adult franchise did public opinion 
completely displace the king's confidence as the determinant of political power. 
What did this mean t o the separation of executive and  legislative powers? The 
Crown’s  de facto capacity to persuade parliament in its legislative function 
moderated the organisational separation of these two organs of government. 
However, the two powers remained methodologically separated. The focus of the 
methodological thesis of the doctrine of separation of powers is  not on the 
separation of the people who exercise powers (which is the focus of the diffusion 
thesis) but the distinction of the modes of legislation and executive action. Diffusion 
is the best way of achieving this object but is not the only means. The Greeks and 
Romans were partial to mixed government, in which the sharing of each power 
among the different classes was considered to prevent one class gaining a monopoly 
of all powers. The fact that the ruler was among the legislators was not considered 
fatal to the distinction between  lawmaking and government or to the rule of law. 
Nevertheless, it had also never been doubted that where the ruler could unilaterally 
legislate without reference to any other body or assembly, the distinction between law 
and government is likely to disappear. 
There was hardly a doubt in England as regards the distinction between the Crown 
and the Crown  in Parliament. The Crown in Parliament did not legislate in the 
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manner in which the old monarch legislated by prerogative. It was evident at least 
from the latter part of Elizabeth's reign, that on matters of vital concern to the 
general populace or perhaps more accurately, to those sections of the public 
represented in Parliament, the monarch had little chance of  persuading the 
Commons, whether by threat or by promise. This was why the Stuarts turned to extra-
parliamentary devices of lawmaking and taxation. What the Tudors and the Stuarts 
could not do with their great prerogatives, the less endowed William and Mary and 
the Hanoverians after them certainly could not. The enormous patronage on offer 
and its unreformed composition could not alter the character of Parliament. When 
the monarch  influenced Parliament, she did so as legislator and not as 
dictator. The Crown  decreed but the Crown in Parliament legislated. The 
monarch as the supreme executive was subject to the law. 
Relative to modern times, statutes of general character were few in 
the eighteenth century. The infrequency of such enactments did not reflect a 
misunderstanding of the nature of legislation. Legislation on the modern scale 
was simply not necessary. By the same token, what appears to be a disproportionate 
share of statutes dealing with particulars was not an indication of Parliament's 
desire to engage in day to day government. Rather, it was evidence of Parliament's 
continuing mistrust of discretionary government and its desire to ensure that the law 
of the land was not disturbed except by its own action. The fact that this concern 
led to unnecessary incursions into the executive province was not indicative of an 
intention to subvert the separation of executive and legislative powers but rather, 
reflected Parliament's excessive caution in preserving it. 
 
The separation of powers under parliamentary government  
The nineteenth century has been described as the classical period of the British 
constitution. The Reform Acts of 1832, 1867 and 1884 expanded suffrage (though not 
to women) and eliminated the infamous ‘rotten boroughs’ and ‘pocket boroughs’. The 
capacity to corrupt the electorate was drastically reduced. While the monarch was the 
real executive, Parliament could call ministers to account, impeach them or otherwise 
force them out of office.  Removal of ministers did not disrupt the administration of 
the realm. There was a real separation of powers between the executive monarch and 
the legislature and each balanced the other. The independence of the judiciary had 
been secured by the Act of Settlement 1701. This is the constitution that Baron de   37 
Montesquieu observed and described in his The Spirit of the Laws as the epitome of a 
state where liberty is secured by the tripartite separation of powers. Montesquieu’s 
account was profoundly influential in the founding of the US Constitution to the 
extent that Madison in The Federalist No 47 spoke of him as ‘the oracle who is 
always consulted and cited’ with respect to the doctrine of the separation of powers 
and added that ‘the British Constitution was to Montesquieu, what Homer had been to 
the didactic writers on epic poetry’.
77  It is fair to say that the fundamental features of 
the classical constitution of England were entrenched in the written US constitution 
with the notable difference that the chief executive was elected.   
Three factors helped stabilise the classical constitutional model in the United 
States. One was the formal adoption of a written constitution that articulated the limits 
of the powers of each branch of government and which specified a special procedure 
for amending the constitution. The second was that the executive powers vested in a 
person elected and removable by the people. The third was the early assertion by the 
Marshall Court of the power of judicial review over legislation and by implication 
over executive actions.
78 The Supreme Court thereby established itself as the protector 
and enforcer of the constitution. The great controversies of its jurisprudence 
notwithstanding, the Court has succeeded in maintaining the fundamental features of 
the constitution to this date.  
In England, the Bill of Rights 1688, the Act of Settlement 1701 and associated 
legislation did not add up to a written constitution. While the victorious Parliament 
was happy to place strict limits on the executive power, it was not about to set down 
the limits of its own power.  It was doubtful for historical reasons that the courts 
would have ventured to strike down legislation. Even if they were so inclined, they 
had no frame of reference by which to judge legislative excess.  Yet, the separation of 
powers remained remarkably stable throughout the 19
th century owing to the capacity 
of the Crown and Parliament to counter-balance each other. It was though a 
precarious balance. If one side w as weakened the balance would be lost and the 
system was bound to gravitate to a new equilibrium. The likelihood was that the 
balance would tilt from the unelected monarch to the elected House of Commons..  
The catalyst for the shift of power was the Great Reforms. The electorate 
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became much too big to be manipulated by patronage. With mass democracy, 
politicians had to sway the electorate with popular promises. In order to make and 
deliver on promises politicians had to combine into disciplined parliamentary factions 
or parties. As Crown patronage lost its electoral significance the direction of 
responsibility was reversed. Ministers of the Crown, of necessity, had to be drawn 
from the parties that commanded majority support in Parliament. The convention was 
established that the ministry which lost the confidence of the Commons had to resign, 
Parliament for the most part, could not express its lack of confidence in the ministry 
without actually ending the government's life and often that of the Parliament itself, as 
it would usually require a general election to produce another viable government. This 
situation meant that only political parties that could secure the unquestioning 
obedience of its parliamentary group had any chance of forming an effective 
government. In one of the great ironies of political history the growth of Parliament's 
legal power to remove a government from office actually reduced its political power 
to hold a government to account. 
The executive branch gained a degree of power over the  legislature not 
enjoyed even by the Tudor monarchs. It became the master of the legislative agenda. 
The key difference of course is that new executive unlike the old can be removed by 
the electorate. Although the idea of collective responsibility of a government to a 
parliament it controls is a laughable fiction, a government’s responsibility to the 
electorate is real and palpable. This is the case in stable parliamentary democracies 
despite all the imperfections of electoral systems. The greatest casualty  of these 
developments is the separation of executive and legislative powers regarded in 
classical theory as the cornerstone of the rule of law. Under the new constitutional 
equilibrium, the executive not only has control over laws passed in Parliament but 
also can and does make Parliament delegate to the executive branch vast amounts of 
legislative and quasi judicial powers. Ironically the very notion that governments are 
responsible to elected parliaments became a justification for entrusting arbitrary 
powers to the executive branch. In the case of  Victorian Stevedoring and General 
Contracting Co v Dignan, the High Court of Australia upheld Parliament’s power to 
enact Henry VIII Clauses infamously used by Henry VIII to confer upon himself poer 
to make law by proclamation notwithstanding Parliament’s own laws to the contrary. 
Justice Evatt stated that ministerial responsibility to Parliament militates against the   39 
contention that Parliament alone may exercise legislative power.
79 It has been always 
accepted as unavoidable and unobjectionable for the executive to make subordinate 
legislation under the authority and subject to principles laid down by Act of 
Parliament. However, under the new constitutional order, the executive increasingly 
gained power not only to determine policy and principle outside Parliament but also 
to make law for the particular case without the guidance of principle.  
  The new constitutional equilibrium is an apparent negation of both the 
diffusion thesis and the methodological thesis of the separation of powers doctrine in 
so far as it concerns the executive-legislative divide. However, the dire consequences 
for liberty and constitutional government feared by scholars have not come to pass. 
The reasons for this are many. Some are legal and others social and economic. The 
legal reasons can be stated with confidence but social and economic causes are 
speculative and remain to be investigated by the methodologies of social and 
economic sciences.   
  The steady expansion of judicial review of executive action is the most visible 
legal cause that can explain the arrest of the feared descent to despotism. 
Administrative law has seen a phenomenal growth through the 20
th century. Through 
doctrines such as patent unreasonableness, procedural fairness, fundamental justice, 
legitimate expectations, constructive malice, non-discrimination and many other 
refinements of the traditional grounds of judicial review, superior courts in common 
law countries have tamed the executive discretionary power to an extent unimagined 
by 19
th century jurists. Although constitutional principle does not allow courts to 
make administrative decisions themselves, they have entered the administrative arena 
in the virtual sense to limit the excesses of executive discretion. In Australia, the High 
Court has derived limitations on power from the judicature provisions and the 
democratic structure of the constitution.  
  A probable second cause relates to efforts of parliaments to intensify the 
review of administrative actions by the simplification of judicial remedies and the 
establishment of administrative review tribunals. Australia’s enactment of a package 
of remedial laws including the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 
(imitated by State legislation) and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act provided a 
template for similar initiatives across Commonwealth jurisdictions. More recently, 
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Australian legislatures have awoken to the need to discipline themselves. 
Consequently they have enacted laws that set rigorous standards for the making and 
approval of executive legislation. (See for example, Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 
(NSW), particularly s.9, the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) and the Legislative 
Instruments Act 2003 (Cth)). The Queensland Act seeks to establish a set of 
‘fundamental legislative principles … relating to legislation that underlie a 
parliamentary democracy based on the rule of law’ and prescribes precautions that the 
drafters of legislation should observe in preparing bills delegating power to the 
executive branch. (S. 4). The Commonwealth legislation establishes statutory 
machinery to regulate the making, registration, parliamentary scrutiny and periodic 
repeal of legislative instruments which are rules made by the executive branch under 
delegating legislation. The effects of these laws are mainly directory and they do not 
formally change the constitutional position. It is also too early to measure the impact 
of these laws on governance. What is clear is that the damage to the rule of law by the 
steady fusion of legislative and executive functions through delegated power has been 
recognised by governments, judges and legislators. This is a constitutional 
development of great significance.  
  A third cause is the steady deregulation of economies over the past two 
decades in the common law developed countries. As the state withdraws from sectors 
of the economy, contract takes over. The power of determining rights and duties 
under the law passes from the state to the parties themselves and in cases of disputes 
to private arbitrators and the courts. The process leads to the restoration of the old 
division where the legislature (under executive leadership in parliamentary systems) 
laid down the general rules of the game, the executive restrained itself from arbitrary 
intervention in individual transactions and the judiciary resolved disputes that the 
parties themselves could not, in that process declared clarified and adapted the law to 
changing conditions.  This transformation has happened piecemeal and in some areas 
of social and economic life, state arbitrariness has actually increased. Laws on 
conservation, affirmative action and various forms of speech offer examples of the 
opposite trend. Even so, economic forces cannot be discounted as a cause of the 
stabilisation and the revival of the rule of law and the separation of powers.  
What then is the current constitutional equilibrium in common law 
parliamentary systems? The picture we see is of a government with vast formally   41 
vested powers with respect to both legislation and administration. The potentially 
catastrophic effects of such fusion of powers is checked by an active judiciary and a 
matrix of institutions (political parties, media, interest groups and such like) that keep 
governments under intense scrutiny. In Australia, the Senate has also provided 
balance to executive pre-eminence. The evolution of parliamentary democracy in 
England and the colonies occurred in denial of the fusion thesis of the separation of 
powers doctrine. The maintenance of the rule of law in the new equilibrium owes 
much to the practical survival of the methodological thesis despite continuous 
pressures generated by an executive branch fired by the exigencies of electoral 
politics. The methodological thesis has a precarious hold without the aid of the fusion 
thesis. Yet hold it must if constitutional government is to survive in parliamentary 
democracies. In 1958, Professor Arthur Goodhart wrote a stirring but all too neglected 
essay in defence of the unwritten limitations on the powers of Parliament. It was in 
essence a defence of the methodological thesis. I can do no better than to close this 
essay with his words. 
I believe that its is true to say that the legislative powers of Parliament are 
limited by certain fundamental principles which are universally accepted even 
though there is no other body in the Constitution which can prevent Parliament 
from exceeding these limitations. It is in the defence of such principles that 
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